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588POLITICAL
RESEARCH QUARTERLY this works is a matter of considerable debate" (Jacobson 1997: 157) .1 It is often suggested that peripheral voters mobilized during high-stimulus elections (such as those for president) are primarily responsible for the phenomenon. Because these voters are less knowledgeable of campaign issues, they rely more often on heuristic cues such as partisanship in making their choices for down-ballot offices. Several studies attempt to more precisely identify and measure these effects by examining them at the individual voter level (e.g., Calvert and Ferejohn 1983; Jacobson 1976 Jacobson , 1997 Mondak 1990 ; Mondak and McCurley 1994). For example, Mondak and McCurley (1994: 153) rely on cognitive theories to explain coattail voting "as an efficiency-oriented process." These authors state, "when forming decisions such as which House candidate to support, the individual often will turn to simple cues rather than engaging in an extensive deliberative process."
In the present analysis, I examine coattails in the state setting where partisan cues are expected to be particularly important in voting decisions. While legislative elections in some states have taken on the characteristics of their congressional counterparts (Salmore and Salmore, 1996) , in several other states these contests are barely on the "radar screen" for large segments of the population.2 Given the low profile of these elections, it is likely that a large contingent of voters are brought to the polls by high stimulus races for statewide office (e.g., governor) but also cast ballots for candidates in many down ballot races (e.g., state legislature). Indeed, research indicates that participation in legislative elections fluctuates considerably depending on the presence of important statewide elections (Austin et al.1991 ). Given the low-information context of state legislative elections, this setting would appear to be ideal for observing partybased coattail effects. Either consciously or not, a contingent of the voting public is expected to rely heavily on partisan cues, with the most relevant party being that of the preferred gubernatorial candidate.
Previous research has recognized and measured the impact of coattail effects in sub-national elections. In an article written over two decades ago, "Gubernatorial Coattails: A Vanishing Phenomenon?" Ronald Weber (1980) commented on the strength of coattails in state legislative elections given changes in the electoral environment (e.g., weakening voter attachment to parties, increasing campaign effects, and a Jacobson goes on to speculate about the causal mechanisms responsible for coattails: "Perhaps the presidential choice has a direct influence on the congressional choice; people prefer to vote for candidates sharing their presidential favorite's party affiliation. Or perhaps both choices are influenced by the same set of conditions-for example, disgust with the failures of the current administration or delight with a party platform to which both candidates are committed-and so move in the same direction. It is even conceivable that, on occasion, support for the head of the ticket spills over from support for candidates for lower office" (1997: 157). 2 This is due in part to the low level of congruence between state legislative districts and media markets (Gierzynski and Breaux, 1996) and to the smaller amount of media coverage of state politics by news organizations (Layton and Walton, 1998). 
Interactive Effects
As indicated earlier, the major expectation is that coattails will affect the votes received by state legislative candidates. Citizens brought to the polls by gubernatorial elections end up casting ballots in these and other down-ballot races. Because large numbers of these voters are less informed about these elections, their choices will be based heavily on convenient voting cues such as the partisanship of their preferred gubernatorial candidate. However, there are some conditions under which the strength of the partisan cue is mitigated. Specifically, I examine the influence of incumbency status, legislative professionalism, and competitiveness of the gubernatorial contest.
The first condition expected to lessen the effect of coattails is incumbency State legislative incumbents have many resources at their disposal for becoming well known to constituents (Chubb 1988 A final conditioning influence involves the nature of the statewide race for governor. It is expected that a highly competitive race for governor will enhance the influence of coattails as candidates and parties work hard to mobilize and persuade additional voters. In these high-intensity contests 9 It might seem that this relationship would best be tested with an interaction term using the dichotomous indicator for incumbency However, such an interaction would not fully account for the mitigating role of incumbency given that Democratic challengers compete against Republican incumbents. Tennessee.12 For all but two of the nine states, the information is from the 1998 election cycle (Illinois and Minnesota are from 1994). 10 Election margin is not an ideal measure, in part, because the actual margin is unknown until after the votes are counted. However, it is probably a good proxy for competitiveness given that polls conducted by news organizations leading up to the election give voters a sense of how close the outcome will ultimately be. Gubernatorial election returns aggregated at the state legislative district level were available in only two of these states (California and Minnesota). In one other state, Illinois, the data was obtained from the Almanac of Illinois Politics (Roberts, Kleppner, and Van der Slik, eds., 1996). For the other six states, the data had to be aggregated by hand (from hard copies) or through manipulation of electronic files. The process of matching precinct returns from gubernatorial elections to specific legislative districts is fraught with a number of difficulties, not the least of which is that in some states, absentee voting and "early voting" (as in Tennessee) are tabulated only on the county level. An assumption was made that these votes were cast randomly across the legislative districts and were distributed evenly with each district. The process of allocating the gubernatorial votes to the proper legislative districts is probably as accurate as is possible, given the current constraints on how the data are made available. 12 Attempts were made to gather data from as many states as possible, however, limitations in obtaining both district level gubernatorial election returns (see Footnote 11) and campaign spending information for each candidate made it necessary to restrict the total number of states examined. As states begin to make available election returns that can be more easily aggregated to the district level, our ability to examine a wider number of states over an expanded time frame will be possible. (2000), the group represents a wide range of institutions from California, which is ranked first among all legislatures in the nation, to Arkansas which is ranked fortieth. As one can see, all the candidate and district-level variables are statistically significant and have an effect in the manner that was hypothesized. The average vote share for incumbents is more than nine percent higher than for challengers (the excluded category). Open seat contenders have an average vote share that is more than 4 percent higher than that received by challengers. Campaign effort is also an influential factor where every one-percentage point increase in the relative level of funding results in a vote increase of about 0.2 percent. Past party vote and demographic features also positively affect the percentage of the vote received. Interestingly, higher turnout has a positive and statistically significant influence on the Democratic percentage of the vote.17
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ANALYSIS
The major variable of interest in the model, of course, is gubernatorial coattail. As the results demonstrate, the influence of this factor is strong and statistically significant. The unstandardized coefficient representing governor's 16 Tests for multicollinearity were conducted. Bivariate correlations as well as regressions running each independent variable against all the rest yielded no major relationship that would prevent using these variables simultaneously For example, some of the highest bivariate correlations were between past party vote and campaign spending (Pearson = 0.621) and between legislative professionalism and governor coattail (Pearson = 0.602). 17 Some have warned that using so many variables measured as percentages may produce distorted results in multiple regression analyses. The concern is that the denominator of such ratio measures creates common variance among the independent variables and this can pose difficulties in estimation (e.g., Uslaner 1976). Recent studies demonstrate that this problem has been overstated (e.g., Firebaugh 1988) and that theoretical issues should be the major concern in model specification (Kritzer 1990 Table 3 displays results similar to those in the first column except here the state dummy variables have been replaced with the one variable representing legislative professionalism. Only slightly less variance is explained with these variables (R2 = .85), however, the variable for legislative professionalism is not statistically significant. More importantly, the coefficient for governor coattails remains statistically significant and strong, although its magnitude has been reduced (now at .200). Both sets of analysis in Table 3 demonstrate that coattails have a sizeable impact on state legislative elections, even in the face of controls for a variety of candidate, district, and state-level conditions.18 Having found a relatively strong and consistent effect for coattails, we now move on to determine if this effect is conditioned by the factors hypothesized about earlier. Finally, Table 5 includes an interaction term containing a measure for a competitive gubernatorial election (Governor Coattail X Statewide Governor Margin). Included in this equation is the statistically significant interaction term from Table 4 (Governor Coattail X Open Seat). In addition, a variable for statewide governor margin is also included as a control (no influence is expected). If a highly competitive election increases the impact of governor's coattails, the coefficient for the interaction should be negative.
The results in Table 5 show that the coefficient for this interaction is indeed negative and statistically significant. By varying the gubernatorial vote margin variable from 1 to 30 (the average margin in these states is 29), the coattail effect is reduced by about half, controlling for other effects. Thus, coattail effects are stronger in those states where the statewide races for governor are more competitive.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Overall, these results demonstrate that gubernatorial coattails exert an influence on legislative elections. Far from being a "vanishing phenomenon," their impact appears to be rather substantial, even when subjected to controls for a 19 For the analyses presented in Tables 4 and 5 Legislative professionalism is another factor that was expected to condition the influence of coattails but the analysis found no such effect. Contrary to expectations, the dampening influence of incumbency on coattails did not become stronger as legislative professionalism grew. While such findings appear to run counter to those of other studies (e.g., Berry, Berkman, and Schneiderman 2000; Chubb 1988), it is important to note that previous studies have often been concerned with the overall electoral effect of incumbency Particularly for studies examining the probability of incumbent success (e.g., Berry, Berkman, and Schneiderman 2000; Carey, Niemi, and Powell 2000), a wide assortment of advantages would seem to be responsible (e.g., ability to scare off strong challengers, fundraising advantages, etc.). In this analysis, only a limited part of the incumbency effect is examined-how it conditions partisan voting cues. The reason that incumbency does not rival partisan cues any more in a professional than in a non-professional legislature may be because the saliency of incumbency does not vary much across different institutions. In other words, voter familiarity and awareness of incumbents may be similar in both California and Arkansas.
Previous studies have not looked closely at voter familiarity of legislative incumbents across states, but conditions suggest it may not differ greatly by level of professionalism. It is true that incumbents in highly professional legislatures have greater resources that enable them to keep in close contact with voters (through newsletters, constituency services, etc.). But we also know that districts in professional legislatures tend to have larger populations, making such resources critical for establishing and maintaining a minimal level of contact. In less professionalized legislatures, incumbents have fewer resources for such purposes, but given the smaller districts these perquisites may be less necessary. In citizen legislatures, incumbents maintain familiarity with voters through personal interactions. Therefore, the incumbency cue may be as influential to voters in states with professional legislatures as it is in states that have citizen legislatures. Such conditions would result in the observations generated from this analysis-incumbency's dampening influence on coattails does not vary by level of professionalism.
Even when taking into account the various conditioning effects, the analysis shows that gubernatorial coattails have an important influence on legislative elections. While these effects are strong, one must be careful not to overstate their importance given the current state of competition in legislative districts. As recent studies suggest, there are large numbers of un-contested elections for state legislative office (Van Dunk and Weber 1997). On average, close to 35 percent of recent general elections (1988-1996) go uncontested on a regular basis (Squire 2000) . This trend is due, in part, to the aggressive redistricting efforts of the 1990s and to the role of legislative campaign committees in targeting resources towards competitive seats (Gierzynski, 1992; Shea 1995) . Given these conditions, the opportunities for coattails to have any influence are clearly limited. Perhaps, if more seats were contested, the influence of coattails would play a role in a larger number of legislative elections.
Overall, these findings provide important insight but are clearly a first step in addressing a range of important questions. For example, what factors associated with candidate activity might impinge upon coattail effects? Are certain types of candidates more or less likely to be affected by gubernatorial coattails? Alternatively, what features associated with the executive office might influence coattails? We know that political power of governors varies by state (Beyle 1999), so could these differences affect the strength of gubernatorial coattails? What role might political party organizations play in this. process (particularly at the legislative chamber level)? Collecting data from a wider number of states over several election cycles will make it possible to answer these and other questions surrounding the coattail phenomenon in state legislative elections better.
